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Three experiments were conducted to find out whether the standard Implicit Association Test 
(IAT) could be used to distinguish truthful and deceitful witnesses. We anticipated that IAT ef-
fects would be greater after lying. Participants were asked to answer questions with incorrect 
answers (i.e., the lie condition) or correct answers (i.e., the truthful condition). A third group 
of participants were not interviewed (a control group). Participants then took the IAT, in which 
they were asked to associate correct and incorrect answers with positive or negative attributes. 
Results demonstrate that standard IAT effects are greater after lying than after truth telling, 
but only when attribute labels were clearly and explicitly linked to positive and negative affect. 






on cues to deception has increased in recent years, 





















of the additional cognitive processes associated with 
the decision to lie and the construction of a lie (see 
also Spence et al., 2001).
  Gregg (2007) used another reaction time–based 
lie detection test called the Timed Antagonistic Re-
sponse Alethiometer (TARA). The TARA requires 




whereas participants who tell the truth perform two 
compatible classification tasks. As a consequence, 
dishonest respondents were forced to perform more 
slowly than honest respondents in order to achieve 
equivalent levels of accuracy. Gregg found that the 
TARA could distinguish groups of liars and truth 
tellers with 85% accuracy.





which speed of response is intended to assess the 

























studies confirm the construct and predictive validity 
of the IAT as legitimate measure of implicit attitudes 
(see Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001, for a summary of 
studies on the validity of the IAT).
 Although the IAT was intended to measure at-
titudes or feelings associated with certain people, 






on salience asymmetries while holding associations 
between categories constant. Although Rothermund 

























aIAT could distinguish groups of liars and truth tell-
ers with 91% accuracy (higher than that associated 
with TARA).








words associated with positive affect and a different 





incorrect answers or words associated with positive 
affect. We hypothesized that participants in the de-
ception condition would be slower at following rules 
that paired correct answers with negative affect and 





than participants in the truth condition at associating 
incorrect answers with positive affect because lying 
might elicit more of a negative reaction to this pair-
ing. If the salience account is true, then participants 
in the deception condition should experience more 
of an interference effect because lying might facilitate 
perception of a salience mismatch.





of this study could have implications for the theoreti-
cal mechanisms of the IAT.
experiment 1a
Participants in Experiment 1a responded to the IAT, 
in which they were asked to associate deceptive or 
























superb, pleasure, beautiful, joyful, glorious, lovely, 
and wonderful) and eight negative (tragic, horrible, 
agony, painful, terrible, awful, humiliate, and nasty) 
attributes.
  The IAT was administered on Dell XPS 410 desk-








engaged in a study phase and then an interview phase, 
each conducted by a different experimenter. During 
the study phase, participants were handed a list of 













the correct and incorrect answers during the study 
phase and then answered the eight questions with the 
correct answers orally during a brief interview (a sec-
ond control condition). Participants in the deception 
condition studied the correct and incorrect answers 
during the study phase and then answered the eight 
questions with the incorrect answers orally during a 
brief interview (the treatment condition). The first 
experimenter in the truth condition ended the study 
phase by instructing the participants to tell the truth 
during the interview with the next experimenter. The 
first experimenter in the deception condition ended 
the study phase by instructing participants to provide 
incorrect answers during the interview with the next 
experimenter, even though the second interviewer 
impliCit assoCiation test anD DeCeption  •  223
told them to provide the correct item. Instructions 
regarding the procedure of the experiment found in 
the informed consent also reinforced the idea that par-
ticipants should answer questions during the interview 
with the answers specified by the first experimenter 




from the study phase and made eye contact with the 
participants when they answered the questions.
IAT PhASE
After the interview (or after the study phase in the case 
of participants in the no-interview condition), partici-
pants responded to the IAT on the computer. Partici-

















phase was shown at the center of the screen, and the 
rules were shown at the top of the screen.
design







The answers recorded during the two interview con-
ditions were analyzed in order to assess the extent 





of the time on average (SD = .76).
 IAT data were analyzed using the scoring al-












 Before calculating D, we discarded RTs shorter 
than 300 ms or longer than 10,000 ms. Latencies were 
log-transformed in order to normalize the distribu-
tion and meet the assumptions for the inferential 
statistics used in this study.





table 1. Blocks used for the standard Implicit Association Test
    Block 4: Reversed Block 5: Reversed 
Response Block 1: Accuracy Block 2: Attribute Block 3: Accuracy + accuracy accuracy +  
key discrimination discrimination attribute combined discrimination attribute combined
“E” correct good correct and  Bad correct 
   good  and bad
“I” Incorrect Bad Incorrect  good Incorrect 
   and bad  and good
Note. The orders of Blocks 3 and 5 and of Blocks 2 and 4 were reversed for half the participants.
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1. The IAT effects associated with the interview types 





interaction were not significant, Fs < 1.
 Results indicated that participants were faster 
when rules required them to pair correct informa-
tion with “good” words  and  incorrect  informa-
tion with “bad” words than the other way around. 
However, the magnitude of these IAT effects was 
similar in all three conditions (the lie, truth, and 
no-interview conditions).
experiment 1b
In addition to replicating Experiment 1a, Experiment 
1b included a measure of explicit (i.e., self-reported) 
attitudes. Past studies have demonstrated that implic-











objective terms Response A and Response B on the 
computer screen, and having each represent correct 
items half the time and incorrect items half the time, 













Correct and incorrect answers were referred to as 
Response A and Response B, respectively, or vice 
versa. Response Set A represented incorrect items 
for half of all participants and correct for the remain-
ing participants. The same was true for Response 
Set B. Response A and Response B were shown in 
place of correct and incorrect answers within the 
IAT. We included “feeling thermometers” as rat-
ings of explicit attitude toward the answers studied 
during the interview (see Dasgupta & Greenwald, 
2001, for more details). Participants placed an X on 
a picture of a thermometer at a point that expressed 
their attitude toward a particular word from the in-
terview, from 0° (cold or unfavorable) to 100° (warm 
or favorable; 50° = neutral). Another procedural dif-
ference was that we asked participants to memorize 
which answers were associated with Response A and 
Response B during the study phase. Participants in 
the truth condition were asked by the first experi-
menter to respond with the same response set as that 
requested during the interview, whereas participants 
in the deception condition were asked by the first 
experimenter to respond with the response set that 
was not requested during the interview.
RESUlTS ANd dIScUSSION
Answers recorded during the interview were ana-
lyzed. Participants in the truth condition answered 
questions with response set items requested during 
figure 1. Effects of interview type on Implicit Association Test 
effects, Experiment 1a
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the interview 92% of the time on average (SD = .68). 
Participants in the deception condition responded 
with response set items not requested during the in-
terview 94% of the time on average (SD = .72).










 Explicit measures of attitudes toward answers 
during the interview were measured using feeling 
thermometers. The higher the ratings, the more favor-
able was the participant’s attitude toward the answer. 
When we analyzed incorrect answers only, a difference 












ing that participants are slower responding to rules 
that pair incorrect information with “good” attributes 
than with “bad” attributes. The magnitude of these 
IAT effects toward incorrect information was not 
found to differ significantly between the three types of 
interview conditions (the lie, truth, and no-interview 
conditions). Explicit ratings of attitudes toward in-
correct answers, on the other hand, were affected by 














the accuracy of information, an explanation hereafter 
referred to as the accuracy account. In Experiment 
2, we manipulated the attribute labels used. In one 
condition, we used good and bad, as before; in the 
other condition, we used positive affect and negative 
affect.
 We also set up Experiment 2 so that stimuli were 
correct for some participants but incorrect for oth-
ers (using a crime scene description with two dif-
ferent sets of target items). In this way, we were able 
to determine whether the standard IAT is useful in 




The experiment included 108 undergraduate students 
(80 women and 28 men) from Southern New Hamp-
shire University who were recruited on a voluntary 
figure 2. Effects of interview type on Implicit Association Test 
effects, Experiment 1b






modified version of an actual police confrontation 
that took place in New York City (see Appendix 
B), based on a New York Magazine article (Rovzar, 
2009). Six  items in the description were critical 
items  (italicized  in Appendix B). Notice  that  in 
Appendix B, there are two versions of each of the 
six critical items. One of the versions was associ-






served equally often as Response A and Response 
B items.
IAT
The IAT was administered using the same equipment 
and software as in Experiments 1a and 1b. Response 








STUdY ANd INTERvIEW PhASE
Participants were asked to study the crime scene 
with Response A critical items and then Response 
B critical items, or vice versa (order of presentation of 
each response set was counterbalanced). Participants 
were told that one of the response sets was correct 
after the study phase was complete. Half of the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned to the Response 










interview condition were not interviewed (a control 
condition). There were two interview conditions, 
conducted in the same way as in Experiments 1a and 
1b: the truth and deception conditions. Again, one 
experimenter provided the instructions for the study 
phase, and a different experimenter conducted the 
interview for the truth and deception conditions. The 
first experimenter in the truth condition instructed 
the participant to respond with the response set 
asked for by the interviewer. The first experimenter in 
the deception condition instructed the participant to 
respond with the response set that was not asked for 
by the interviewer (e.g., the first experimenter might 










The experimental design used was a 3 (type of inter-
view: truth, lie, or no interview) × 2 (type of attribute 
label: “Good” and “Bad” or “Positive Affect” and 












items in the Response Set A correct condition or 
responding with Response Set B items in the Re-
sponse Set B correct condition) 90% of the time on 
average (SD = .76). Participants in the deception 
condition responded with the response set opposite 
of that requested by the interviewer (responding 
with Response Set B items in the Response Set A 
correct condition or responding with Response Set 
A items in the Response Set B correct condition) 




in the truth condition responded with response set 
items consistent with that requested by the inter-
viewer 92% of the time on average (SD = .68). Par-
ticipants in the deception condition responded with 






Data are shown in Table 2. Positive D scores indicate 
a faster response when Response A was paired with 
the label “Positive Affect” or “Good” than “Negative 




positive D score in the Response A correct condi-
tion or a negative D score in the Response B correct 
condition.
 Across all conditions in Experiment 2, IAT ef-
fects were more positive for the Response A correct 
condition than the Response B correct condition, 
F(1, 102) = 311.21, prep = .93, η2 = .07. A main effect 
for interview type and an interview type × response 
type interaction did not occur, Fs < 1. However, 
there was a significant three-way interaction of in-
terview type × response type × attribute label, F(2, 
102) = 3.02, prep = .97, η2 = .05. The two-way interac-








appears to slow down reaction to any rule that re-






with positive and negative affect, IAT effects are even 
greater after lying than after truth telling (Experiment 
2). These findings are consistent with other studies, 
which have demonstrated that a similar version of 
the IAT, namely the aIAT, can distinguish deceptive 
witnesses from truthful ones (Sartori et al., 2008; Ver-
schuere, Prati, & De Houwer, 2009). This series of 
experiments extends these findings to reveal that the 
sIAT for correct and incorrect information can also 
distinguish deceptive and truthful witnesses.
 We originally suspected that Experiments 1a and 
table 2. Mean Implicit Association Test effects (ds), reaction times (RTs, in ms), standard deviations, and hit rates by 
type of interview
 Type of interview
 Deception Truth No interview
 D RT (SD) Hit rate (%) D RT (SD) Hit rate (%) D RT (SD) Hit rate (%)
 “Positive Affect” versus “Negative Affect”
Response A correct +.81 517 (.56) 95 +.52 372 (.54) 67 +.50 364 (.47) 63
Response B correct –.88 524 (.51) 92 –.49 369 (.48) 65 –.47 362 (.46) 64
 “Good” versus “Bad”
Response A correct +.54 378 (.61) 70 +.49 359 (.58) 67 +.45 352 (.50) 65
Response B correct –.50 370 (.55) 74 –.52 368 (.46) 73 –.43 349 (.52) 66
Note. Positive d scores indicate a faster response when Response A was paired with the label “Positive Affect” or “good” than “Negative Affect” or “Bad.” 
Negative d scores indicate a faster response when Response B was paired with the label “Positive Affect” or “good” than “Negative Affect” or “Bad.” A hit 
occurred when a participant had a positive d score in the Response A correct condition or a negative d score in the Response B correct condition.









ated with feelings rather than accuracy, lying led to 
larger IAT effects than telling the truth (or after not 
being interviewed at all). Although this finding is con-
sistent with the affective account, we cannot rule out 
some other potential explanations. For example, the 
results might also reflect greater salience of incorrect 







research, further understanding of why a negative im-

















indicated a more negative attitude toward incorrect 
information than correct information. Furthermore, 
ratings for answers that were previously associated 
with telling lies were higher than for answers previ-
ously associated with telling the truth. This finding 




 Although the construct and predictive validity of 
the IAT are well established for its use in detecting 
implicit racial attitudes in most studies (Dasgupta et 
al., 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998; McConnell & Lei-
bold, 2001, but see Kinoshita & Peek-O’Leary, 2005), 
future research will need to determine the validity of 


























 Incorrect Answer: Bear
 Correct Answer: Penman
3.  What is the color of the leather chairs out in the hallways 
and lobbies of Robert Frost Hall?
 Incorrect Answer: Red








 Correct Answer: Manchester
6.  In which month does school begin at Southern New 
Hampshire University?
 Incorrect Answer: August
 Correct Answer: September
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7.  What are the school colors of Southern New Hampshire 
University?
 Incorrect Answer: Green and gold
 Correct Answer: Blue and yellow
8.  What brand of computers is used in the first floor lab in 
Robert Frost Hall?
 Incorrect Answer: Macintosh
 Correct Answer: Dell
APPENdIx B. cRIME ScENE dEScRIPTION, ExPERIMENT 2
Yesterday a man was handcuffed [in Times Square/outside 
of Yankee Stadium] for wandering around in a [Superman/
Batman] costume. Police approached [Maksim “Clark Kent” 






Batman]!” Eventually, he allegedly [punched a female cop/
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